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Abstract—Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a widely used
protocol for voice and video communication in Internet archi-
tecture. Due to its open nature and the lack of robust security
mechanisms, SIP is vulnerable to several attacks similar to those
existing in Internet infrastructure, such as the flooding attack.
An attacker can use any SIP request to launch a flooding attack,
leading to severe consequences at either client or server side SIP
elements or both of them. In this context, end user’s devices
are considered more vulnerable to flooding attacks due to their
limited capabilities. In this paper, we focus on INVITE flooding
attack for which we propose a simple and robust detection
scheme. This scheme prevents an attacker from launching an
INVITE flood through a transition state table used by the
proxy to analyse the incoming INVITE requests and exclude the
suspicious ones. Our scheme requires also that the end-user keeps
track of the time and IP addresses of each incoming request.
Furthermore, we modify the header of the REGISTER request
by adding a new field named Critical number which holds the
value of maximum number of users or callers that could easily be
handled by the end user. Unlike the existing solutions, our scheme
does not require any special detection device or firewall at the SIP
server. The proposed mechanism has been implemented in SIP
Express Router (SER) and the obtained results have confirmed
its effectiveness.
Keywords – Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP), Denial of Service, INVITE Flooding
Attack, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application layer protocol
which creates, modifies and terminates multimedia sessions [3]. SIP
can be combined with other protocols such as RTP (Real Time
Transport Protocol) [1] and SDP (Session Description Protocol) [2]
to build complete multimedia architecture, for example.
Using the SIP address, the user finds the current location of the
destination from a registrar which extracts it from the location server.
The user needs to register with the combination of SIP addresses with
its current IP location. Registration in SIP [3] is a way to associate
the SIP URI (Uniform Resource Indicator) with the machine into
which the user is currently logged on. It helps to find the current
location of the callee through the proxy. The proxy server queries
the registrar that contains the location server which is a database
holding the users’ records (i.e. their SIP URIs and their current IP
addresses).
There are different types of attacks targeting VoIP protocols,
such as DoS attacks, call hijacking, toll fraud, SPam over Internet
Telephony (SPIT) and vishing [4]. DoS attack is the most devas-
tating attack amongst all. A DoS attack includes signaling attacks,
malformed packets and flooding attacks. Flooding is one of the SIP
application attacks which exhausts the memory, CPU and bandwidth
of the victim user. Due to its harmful impact on SIP performance,
we will mainly focus, in this paper, on designing a robust solution
to deal with this attack.
SIP security has attracted a lot of attention from the research
community in order to cope with the aforementioned attacks. As a
result, numerous solutions have been proposed to deal with flooding
attack in SIP, such as [5], [6], [7], [8], [12] and [9]. To complement
these efforts and overcome their limitations (e.g., cost, implementa-
tion complications and extensive changes in servers), we propose in
this paper a lightweight countermeasure to secure SIP against this
harmful attack.
In this paper, We design and implement in a test-bed a simple,
practical and robust solution to secure the end user against SIP request
flooding attack. This work is an extension and improvement of our
previous work [13] based on the strategic model. In this work, we use
the address of the incoming requests, destination address and arrival
time of a particular request to monitor the number of transactions
towards a particular end user. In SIP, each user device can handle a
number of incoming requests according to its processing capacity,
memory and bandwidth. According to SIP specifications [3], the
SIP headers are extendable, so that we have added a new metric
named ”Critical Number” in REGISTER header. The end user uses
this header to inform the server side about the maximum number of
requests that it is able to handle. This information is defined in the
”Critical Number” (CN) field which should be set during the device
registration phase at the proxy server. To prevent overwhelming the
end user, the proxy ensures that the number of requests forwarded to
this end user doesn’t exceed the critical number value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we give
a brief description of the flooding attack. The next section summaries
the literature followed by a detailed description of the proposed
solution, in section IV. The evaluation results of our solution are
presented and discussed in section V. Finally, we conclude the paper
in section VI.
II. REQUEST FLOODING ATTACKS IN SIP
INVITE Flooding attack is one of the most devastating attacks
targeting SIP. In this attack, the attacker generates several INVITE
requests to exhaust the server and callee resources. Both of SIP
proxy and end user are vulnerable to flooding attack. The proxy
must be connected with the callee for several minutes and due to
that it is easy to keep it busy by sending a large number of INVITE
requests, without waiting for the corresponding acknowledgment.
Figure 1 shows the SIP call establishment. We can distinguish several
scenarios of flooding attack in SIP, as described in the following.
The attacker could be a legal SIP user, so it has an account in
SIP server and consequently it is treated as a legitimate SIP user.
However, it puts the callee in busy situation by the flood of INVITE
requests. On the other hand, the attacker could be an outsider if
no authentication mechanism is in place. This type of attack is not
easy to detect due to the insecure environment. Another possibility of
INVITE flooding could be the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Figure 1: An example of SIP session with multiple proxies
Figure 2: Illustration of Flooding attack on UAS
in which many attackers launch the attack from different locations
in a distributed fashion. Every soft-phone has different number of
parallel calls receiving capability. Therefore, coping with such attack
is a real challenge for the research community.
Figure 2 depicts the flooding of INVITE request. Here, the caller
sends many INVITE requests to flood the proxy or end user. Until
and unless the proxy is connected to the desired callee, it must keep
connection with the caller. On the other hand, despite that the caller
receives TRYING message from the proxy it ignores it and sends a
new INVITE request without waiting for further signals.
As defined in SIP draft, the proxy has to keep connection at least
for some minutes when it receives an INVITE request from any caller.
Therefore, the caller exploits this vulnerability and floods INVITE
requests to exhaust both of the end user and proxy, which paralyzes
the system and prevents the target end user from responding to other
callers as well as to the proxy.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the most significant contributions that
has been proposed to cope with the flooding attack in SIP.
In [5], the authors have proposed a special architecture to imple-
ment a scalable prevention scheme to defend against DoS attacks in
SIP. Their scheme is based on an SIP-aware firewall design composed
of two filters, a dynamic pinhole filter for media traffic and SIP-
specific filter for signaling traffic. Moreover, this scheme implements
different defense mechanisms, such as Return Routability Filter, Rate-
limiting Filters and SIP transition state validation. Although this
scheme can offer some levels of robustness against DoS attacks it
still have some limitations, for example a firewall does not protect
against authorized internal users who behave maliciously. It cannot
also protect from the internal flaws of the network. Additionally, the
rules defined by this scheme to detect DoS attacks do not cover all
possible attack scenarios.
To avoid the aforementioned limitations of this scheme, [6] has
proposed a secure architecture, while [10] has applied Hellinger
Distance and Sketch technique together to avoid flooding attacks.
The authors of [7] have used an anomaly detection device which
is placed before the proxy to detect the INVITE flooding attack.
These anomaly detection devices are designed based on Finite State
Machine (FSM) and each of them has the capability to detect flooding
through different threshold parameters. This solution requires to put a
detection device at every SIP server, which makes it a costly solution
that doesn’t suit our needs and our network constraints.
In [12], two types of DoS attacks have been dealt with. The first
attack type is that launched by the external users which is usually
detected through firewall like solutions. The second attack type is
known as network reconfiguration attack. This work is focused on
monitoring the users for generating false messages, broken sessions,
and abrupt increase in the number of transactions on stateful proxies.
It emphasizes on server design in case of stateless proxy, however
there is no specific mechanism proposed for the prevention of
INVITE flooding except monitoring the traffic.
The work described in [11] suggests to put a Snort at the entry
point of SIP traffic. This solution is based on Snort IDS (Intrusion
Detection System) which inspects the packet load to protect it from
the multiple signaling requests through specific detection rules in IDS.
This solution is useful for DNS (Domain Name Service) blocking,
malicious messages and flooding in SIP, however there is no solution
proposed to deal with flooding attack targeting the end user.
Compared to the solutions presented in this section, the solution
that we will present throughout the rest of the paper is practical and
cost effective. It does not need any add-on detection device or any
other complex technique, but it just require a slight modification to
SIP REGISTER header along with a transition state table to be added
at the proxy side, as described in next section.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Most of the existing solutions have focused on adding firewalls,
anomaly detection devices and intrusion detection systems at the
SIP proxy to defend against INVITE flooding attack. In contrast,
our proposed scheme is cheaper in cost and practical. It consists in
adding a table with three metrics at the proxy and a new field dubbed
”Critical Number” in the registrar of SIP proxy during user’s device
registration phase. Our solution could generally applied on any SIP
request method, however, in this paper, we focus on INVITE request
method.
Our main concern, in this work, is to reduce as much as possible
the callee’s extra-load incurred by the unusual SIP flooding request
attack. Usually, a caller may receive a large number of calls in
some specific circumstances like emergency, anniversaries, happy and
sad moments. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish those special
occasions from a flooding attack, but at least we will prevent a huge
number of SIP request to be forwarded towards a particular callee,
because this behavior is considered as an attack that leads to callee’s
resources depletion.
Table I: Different callers sending INVITE requests at different
times
Method Source IP Destination IP Arrival time
INVITE 206.219.77.11 195.228.240.177 16:21:45-50
INVITE 64.95.79.4 134.96.68.36 14:53:12-17
INVITE 216.34.121.18 129.15.12.256 5:13:52-57
INVITE — — —
INVITE 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 9:26:12-17
Table II: The same caller is sending many INVITE requests
at the same time
Method Source IP Destination IP Arrival time
INVITE 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 10:42:42-47
INVITE 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 10:42:42-47
INVITE 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 10:42:42-47
INVITE — — —
INVITE 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 10:42:42-47
A. Transition state table for the SIP proxy
We propose to add a transition state table in the SIP proxy to detect
the malicious behavior of SIP users. As it is well known, there are
two types of SIP proxies, stateful and stateless. Stateful proxy saves
the history of all connections, transitions and traffic in the buffer of
the server for future use, whereas the stateless proxy is used only as
an intermediate element that forwards the request from the caller to
the callee. In stateless proxy, the information is kept in the buffer at
least during the SIP transaction. Unlike stateful proxy, it cannot save
the transactions for future use. In our solution, we add a transition
state table that contains three entries as follows; (i) command, (ii)
IP address, and (iii) arrival time. The command shows the type of
request sent by the caller. As we are trying to protect both of the
proxy and the end user from the flood of INVITE requests, hence
the proxy adds an entry in the table upon reception of INVITE request
only. We then use the source and destination IP addresses entries to
keep track of the caller and callee, respectively, as shown in Table
III. The Arrival time entry records the time at which the proxy has
received the INVITE request from the caller.
We extract the source and destination IP addresses as well as the
arrival time as metrics of the transition state table. later, we use these
metrics for detecting flooding attacks. The time unit used to detect
the flooding attack is micro-seconds. Normal SIP call establishment
is described in Table I where different callers are calling the same
destination but at different times and origins.
Table III: Different callers sending INVITE requests at the
same time (DDoS)
Method Source IP Destination IP Arrival time
INVITE 208.219.77.11 129.105.12.256 09:26:22-27
INVITE 195.228.240.177 129.15.12.256 09:26:22-27
INVITE 64.95.79.40 129.105.12.256 09:26:22-27
INVITE — — —.
INVITE cyan 202.212.5.47 129.105.12.256 09:26:22-27
B. The Critical Number (CN )
We have introduced a new header dubbed ”Critical Number”, as
it is allowed to extend the SIP request by adding new headers to
support new services (see RFC 3261 [3]). This new header is used to
advertise the end users’ capabilities, in terms of requests processing
per second, to the server side.
Table IV: Example of an extended SIP Registrar: it contains
the new field named ”Critical Number”
SIP URI IP Address Critical Number
sip:abc@misc.com 134.206.11.61 10
sip:jkl@lifl.com 191.13.121.11 15
sip:xyz@cyber.com 139.12.131.61 12
We know that proxy searches current location of the destination
from the registrar, which in turn extracts this information from the
location server. The user needs to register the combination of SIP
addresses with its current IP location. In our detection and prevention
mechanism, we should know the critical number of each end user.
So, if the proxy is aware of all critical numbers values, it can easily
block the flooding attack according to the capacity of the callee. To
do so, we propose that the end user sends its critical number with its
SIP URI and current IP Address during the registration phase. Table
IV depicts the three metrics; SIP URI, IP Address and the critical
number of the end user.
To avoid legitimate calls blocking according to the device capacity,
we propose a dynamic threshold that differs according to the capabil-
ity of different devices. For example the same user can use different
devices, e.g., Mobile, Soft-phone, traditional phone and conferencing
tool.
Figure 3 illustrates the registration process of a device according
to our scheme, where the user sends its CN value with its registration
details. Figure 4 presents the call establishment of SIP after applying
our scheme. Firstly, the caller will send the INVITE request through
the proxy. Then, this latter will examine the Arrival time, IP Address
and the total number of requests (TN) for a each user, then it
compares the TN value for a specific user with its Critical number.
To this end, the proxy demands the CN from the Registrar and if the
TN is less than the CN value then it transfers the INVITE request to
the callee. Otherwise, the proxy blocks the other requests until any
of the previous requests has been terminated. Notice that the proxy
treats the awaited requests in a priority of first-come-first-serve basis.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the reaction of the proxy when the number
of received requests towards a given callee has reached its CN , in
case of receiving multiples requests from a single caller and when
these requests are generated by different senders. Upon reception of a
new call towards a given end callee, the proxy checks first whether the
CN has been reached or not. If so, it then generates a waiting queue
for this callee in which the new incoming calls will be stored. We
assume that the proxy is able to receive many requests at a specific
time frame and maintain the queue, which can produce better security.
Whenever any of the ongoing calls terminated, the proxy release a
new call from waiting queue. In the second and third cases, the IP
addresses of the request’s sources as well as their arrival times are
the main metrics used by our scheme to distinguish the normal call
from an attack.
C. Dealing with single source & DDoS
In single source flooding (as depicted in Table II), the table
holds the same value of IP address for all requests as well as the
same arrival time for every single request. In case of receiving
multiple requests from the same IP address during a particular time
window, we can hold the flood of INVITE through a special detection
mechanism that senses the high number of INVITE floods based on
the information hold by the transition state table. When the detection
system detects a high number of incoming INVITE requests from
the same origin at the same arrival time, it blocks this user. Note
Algorithm 1 Queue generation at proxy in case of single and
DDoS flooding attack
1: Case 1: when the Critical number of an end user has
been reached;
2: if (Received BYE == Id Callee) then
3: if (Request table) is not empty then
4: Forward new request;
5: N - -;
6: end if
7: end if
8: Case 2: of multiple requests from a single end user;
9: Extract IP addresses of the callers from Transition state
table;
10: if (IP Addresses are the same for all requests) then
11: Check the Arrival Time for those IP Addresses;
12: if (Arrival time) is the same for all IP Addresses then
13: Block those requests;
14: end if
15: end if
16: Case 3: of DDoS attack;
17: Extract IP addresses of the callers from Transition state
table;
18: if (IP Addresses are different) then
19: Check the Arrival Time for those IP Addresses;
20: if (Arrival time) is same for all IP Addresses then
21: Block those requests;
22: end if
23: end if
N : is the total number of requests stored at the Transition
state table;
Figure 3: User Registration phase in our scheme
that the proxy does not take any actions against a suspected user
until the INVITE flood level reaches the CN. Considering the user
device, we can have the value of the CN as maximum number of
requests which can easily be handled by the end user device. The
proxy checks and works according to the CN value of the end user
device which results in efficient prevention from flooding attacks.
In the same manner, DDoS is prevented by analyzing the different
callers calling to the same callee, at the same time slot, as shown in
Table III.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The proposed mechanism has been implemented in SIP Express
Router (SER) which is one of the most known open source SIP
Figure 4: Block diagram of our scheme during call establish-
ment phase
Figure 5: Number of INVITE requests vs. response time
(under low flooding rate)
servers. The machine used for this platform is 1GHz processor with
1GB RAM. Figure 5 shows the number of INVITE requests versus
the obtained response time, while Figure 6 depicts the number of
REGISTER requests versus the obtained response time. As we can
see from both figures, when our scheme is enabled (i.e. the blue
curve) the obtained response time (in microseconds) is lower than
that obtained in case of SIP standard (i.e. the red curve), and its
average values range from 0.4 s to 0.7 s. Hence, this proves the
effectiveness of our scheme.
It is worth mentioning that, in one part of our solution’s evaluation
scenarios, we have generated the attacks at a flooding rate that varies
between 50 requests/second and 100 requests/second in both cases of
INVITE and REGISTER. The obtained results show that the proxy
server responds efficiently when our scheme is enabled.
As the proposed scheme introduces new header, we have extended
the core of SER to support the CN header parsing similar to other
existing mandatory headers. Consequently, as a SIP request message
received by SER is able to be recognized and parsed automatically
then the critical number header can provide this information to any
application and service that needs it. Besides, the SER offers the
ability to build new functionality and services through its modular
architecture without affecting the existing services and applications.
Thus, we have built our scheme in a module.
Figures 7 and 8 reveal that the response time of our scheme has
increased compared to the results obtained in Figures 5 and 6 due to
the high flooding rate that we have used in this scenario. The average
values of the obtained response time range from 0.5 s to 1.0 s in
both cases of INVITE and REGISTER requests. Despite this increase
in the response time, our scheme still outperforming SIP standard as
the response time of SIP server in this latter case is longer than that
Figure 6: Number of REGISTER requests vs. response time
(under low flooding rate)
Figure 7: Number of INVITE requests vs. response time
(under high flooding rate)
achieved under our scheme. Finally, we remark that the increase of
the flooding rate leads to a little instability in terms of response time.
To summarize, we can say that our scheme performs very well
under low rate DoS and DDoS attacks, however it experiences a slight
instability under higher flooding rates. Nevertheless, the obtained
response time under both of flooding rates is lower than that achieved
by SIP standard (i.e., when our scheme is disabled). Therefore, our
scheme is an effective countermeasure to the flooding attack in SIP.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a novel scheme to deal with INVITE flooding
attack in SIP. In our scheme, we add a transition state table at the
proxy side in order to ease the detection of the unusual reception
of INVITE requests. Moreover, we slightly modify the REGISTER
request header by adding the Critical Number field which is used by
the end user to inform its corresponding proxy, during the registration
phase, about the maximum number of calls that it can support.
Thus, using this information the proxy is able to limit the number
of INVITE requests forwarded to this callee and therefore prevents
the congestion problem. We have mainly focused on two scenarios
of flooding attack which are; the case of a single caller sending
large number of INVITE requests towards the same callee within a
small time interval and the case where multiple callers send INVITE
requests towards the same callee simultaneously. According to the
Figure 8: Number of REGISTER requests vs. response time
(under high flooding rate)
obtained results in our test-bed, our scheme significantly decreases the
likelihood of congestion at both proxy and end user. This is justified
by the short response time for both INVITE and REGISTER requests.
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